Views on the nature of Morality

[Colanth]

Harris asserts that whenever you talk about morality and what is moral, you always refer to the well-being of some concious creature

And he's wrong.

Like I said to you earlier, rather than simply assert it, explain why that is the case. More specifically, where does morality NOT have to do with the well-being of concious creatures.

Otherwise it's just the "Nuh-uh" defense. :-/

Please try to keep up.  I'm not going to restate the entire history of my conclusion in every sentence.  Sometimes, the reason for one paragraph is in the next paragraph.

Sacrificing someone else in what context?

Is the guy who jumps on the grenade to save the rest of the company performing a moral or immoral act?  (From the viewpoint of his own well-being?)

Again, a fundamental misunderstanding. Harris' argument doesn't simply refer to your own well-being, but overall.

"some concious creature" (your words, and what I responded to) refers to the well-being of a single creature, not "overall".

If by taking the brunt of the grenade that dude saves everyone else, he by definition prevented a greater decrease to well-being.

But the well-being of "that dude" (a concious creature) was greatly (some would say ultimately) decreased.

Please return the goal posts to their previous position.

[Colanth]

I'm confused, because I don't recall Harris making the claim that we have an inherent right to well-being. Rights are things we grant (self-evidently) ourselves, not. existent things themselves. Harris' assertion is that we know what is condusive to well-being

Only according to our own definition of well-being, which is both circular and totally subjective.

(which he says morality can be equated to since they are never found apart in discussions on morality)

Since we've discussed morality without mentioning well-being right here on this forum, he's wrong about that.

and therefore it can be objectively said what is moral.

Since the basis is incorrect, the conclusion is invalid.  And, in this case, incorrect.)

So it has nothing to do (if I remember correctly) with saying that life and well-being are intrisically valuable, but that we know what does and does not work to furthering those.

No, it's saying that life itself has some intrinsic value that's greater than non-life.  That's what he's saying.  Whether you can understand that it's what he's saying is another matter.

Now, you're follow up question will be probably be along the lines of "Why you should be moral?", which is not the same thing as "What is moral? / How do you decide if something is moral?" which I think is what Harris' intent was.

But the discussion isn't how to decide whether something is moral, but whether morality itself has some objective existence or whether it's purely subjective.  How we decide whether something is moral is the same whether morality is objective or subjective.

You reflect on the consequences of your actions and consider what would appear to be condusive to well-being

That only works is morality has some direct relation to well-being, which you Kant and Harris never show.  (Asserting it isn't showing it.)

[GurrenLagann]

You're not making any sense dude. The universe isn't a concious, living being, therefore trying to apply 'well-being' to it is about the stupidest response you could've made.

I said just the opposite, cause you who asked for evidence that morality is subjective, that it's stupid.

Elaborate? You can assert that it's subjective (or rather that there are no objective moral values), but I really am waiting to read how that explain how.

1) I'm afraid I don't follow. There's nothing in Harris' argument that even corresponds to your example of faith and God's existence.

The attempt to assert that morality has something objective, leads to metaphysics as an abstraction grants a character solipsistic. "I think, it's real."

Except Harris' attempt is exactly a way to avoid having to do that (and he's by no means the first to try it), hence the subtitle "How Science can Determine our Moral Values".

Please try to keep up.  I'm not going to restate the entire history of my conclusion in every sentence.  Sometimes, the reason for one paragraph is in the next paragraph.

Well, considering you never actually answered this bit (as far as I saw), I didn't see the problem with asking you to answer, since "And he's wrong", is about as much of an answer as me responding "And he's correct".

"some concious creature" (your words, and what I responded to) refers to the well-being of a single creature, not "overall"

I've more properly referred to Harris referring to the overall well-being in other posts I believe.

But the well-being of "that dude" (a concious creature) was greatly (some would say ultimately) decreased.

Please return the goal posts to their previous position.

And if the argument was merely referring to only taking into account your own well-being, you may have had a point.

They never moved. You went for a field goal on the opposite side of the field.


Spoilered for length:

[spoil:20x2fnjg]

Only according to our own definition of well-being, which is both circular and totally subjective.

That was nonsensical. EVERYTHING is defined by us. Based on your reasoning above, we don't know anything objective about health since health is defined by us. Or truth. Or anything else because we define the terms.

Since we've discussed morality without mentioning well-being right here on this forum, he's wrong about that.

Example?

Since the basis is incorrect, the conclusion is invalid.  And, in this case, incorrect.)

I disgree clearly, as per the above.

No, it's saying that life itself has some intrinsic value that's greater than non-life.  That's what he's saying.  Whether you can understand that it's what he's saying is another matter

I don't recall him saying that anywhere. His argument is clearly stated by him simply as "Once you realize that what is moral depends on the well-being of concious creatures, you also realize that there can be objectively valid moral statements made about what is moral." It never says anything about life having any intrinsically more valuable than non-life.

Again, you've entirely missed the point from a previous response of mine to you, which is that you're confusing "What is moral?" with "Why be moral?" which are not the same questions, just as "What is truth?" is not the same questions as "Why be truthful?" This distinction has a crucial difference.

Now, you're follow up question will be probably be along the lines of "Why you should be moral?", which is not the same thing as "What is moral? / How do you decide if something is moral?" which I think is what Harris' intent was.

But the discussion isn't how to decide whether something is moral, but whether morality itself has some objective existence or whether it's purely subjective.  How we decide whether something is moral is the same whether morality is objective or subjective.

The discussion from my OP yes, but I also made a follow up question in a different post (the one you've been responding to) about what you all thought about Harris' attempt to show that objectively moral statements can be made, which is not the same thing.

That only works is morality has some direct relation to well-being, which you Kant and Harris never show.  (Asserting it isn't showing it.)

I thought I gave rudimentary examples earlier (why rape, murder,etc are immoral), and later asked you what discussions on morality here that you've been a part of that discuss what is moral without smuggling in concerns of the well-being of sentient beings; I await an answer.[/spoil:20x2fnjg]

[Farroc]

Morality is only partially subjective.

[Thumpalumpacus]

I think that that is an overreach on his part.  I understand what's being said, that we can define a moral act in direct proportion to what it adds to well-being.  But what of an action that is ambiguous?  What of an action that calls for sacrificing someone else?  But making a prescription for what benefits a body, and making a prescription for what benefits a mind, those are two different things.

Sacrificing someone else in what context?

What if killing one person would save twenty, even though the one person had nothing to do with the others?  Is it moral to kill an innocent man to save more innocent men?

Certainly an objective morality would have a concrete position on this sort of thing.  It's hardly a new question.

[GurrenLagann]

I think that that is an overreach on his part.  I understand what's being said, that we can define a moral act in direct proportion to what it adds to well-being.  But what of an action that is ambiguous?  What of an action that calls for sacrificing someone else?  But making a prescription for what benefits a body, and making a prescription for what benefits a mind, those are two different things.

Sacrificing someone else in what context?

What if killing one person would save twenty, even though the one person had nothing to do with the others?  Is it moral to kill an innocent man to save more innocent men?

Certainly an objective morality would have a concrete position on this sort of thing.  It's hardly a new question.

Thanks for elaborating. :)

I suppose on Harris' argument, that would be the objectively moral thing to do. I recall in his debate against Craig, he said something along the lines of (from memory; not exact), "There are many highs and lows on my Moral Landscape, and yes it may be said that we may have to - at times - descend into a valley so as to ascend to higher peaks."

[Thumpalumpacus]

What if killing one person would save twenty, even though the one person had nothing to do with the others?  Is it moral to kill an innocent man to save more innocent men?

Certainly an objective morality would have a concrete position on this sort of thing.  It's hardly a new question.

Thanks for elaborating. :)

I suppose on Harris' argument, that would be the objectively moral thing to do. I recall in his debate against Craig, he said something along the lines of (from memory; not exact), "There are many highs and lows on my Moral Landscape, and yes it may be said that we may have to - at times - descend into a valley so as to ascend to higher peaks."

Now, imagine yourself to be that single man whose death has been deemed moral.  How fair would the decision strike you?  The morality of the act would likely involve the nature of the decision-making process (were you consulted at all?  Were your feelings considered?).  The morality of the decision would also rely upon the certainty of your death saving the others (if your death only might save the others, would it be as moral a decision as one taken knowing that your death would certainly save the others?)

That thought exercise exemplifies why I think morality is both relative (to the circumstances of the moral act) and subjective (reliant at least in part upon one's relationship to the act).

[GurrenLagann]

Now there's a reply of the sort I've been waiting for. Elaboration makes things easier to understand and talk about. :)

[Colanth]

Sacrificing someone else in what context?

What if killing one person would save twenty, even though the one person had nothing to do with the others?  Is it moral to kill an innocent man to save more innocent men?

Certainly an objective morality would have a concrete position on this sort of thing.  It's hardly a new question.

Thanks for elaborating. :)

I suppose on Harris' argument, that would be the objectively moral thing to do. I recall in his debate against Craig, he said something along the lines of (from memory; not exact), "There are many highs and lows on my Moral Landscape, and yes it may be said that we may have to - at times - descend into a valley so as to ascend to higher peaks."

So what's the objective reason that sacrificing an innocent man to save more than one innocent man is moral?  (An objective moral code would have an objective reason for an act being moral.)  Harris' statement above has nothing to do with the question.

It's the lifeboat question all over again - and no one has ever come up with an objective answer.

[GurrenLagann]

So what's the objective reason that sacrificing an innocent man to save more than one innocent man is moral?  (An objective moral code would have an objective reason for an act being moral.)  Harris' statement above has nothing to do with the question.

It's the lifeboat question all over again - and no one has ever come up with an objective answer.

If you're goal is to improve the overall well-being (as well as prevent as much damage to well-being as you can), then your question answers itself when put that way. When there is certainty in the outcome, what to do to best preserve or improve well-being can in fact be assesed. Hence why Thumpalumpacus' example works while yours doesn't.

And how does it not have to do with the question? I already stated that it was a separate question from my OP that I made in my 2nd post on the 1st page (and the 2 can't even be construed as having been the same question). If you know the outcome (you, an innocent, die to certainly save 20 other innocents) then you can make an objectively moral assessment on what action to take on Harris' argument on what morality is.

That in no way obligates you to do so (that's one weakness with a lot of moral theories like Kant's), as there is nothing about morality that binds one to do anything. Again, it would be like jumping from "Why be truthful?" when asked "What is truth?"

[bennyboy]

I don't think abstract ideas can have a "nature."  The idea is made up by people to represent a relationship between feelings, ideas and behaviors.  But exactly what you mean by any of those things, or which aspects of their relationships you are representing with the word "morality," are arbitrary.

If by morality you mean the tendency of the human brain to react to certain kinds of stimuli in certain ways, I'd argue that's objective-- variable, but approachable with neuroscience and statistical analyses.  If by morality you mean how we "should" act, and what parts of our world "should" elicit particular responses, then it's completely subjective.

[Colanth]

So what's the objective reason that sacrificing an innocent man to save more than one innocent man is moral?  (An objective moral code would have an objective reason for an act being moral.)  Harris' statement above has nothing to do with the question.

It's the lifeboat question all over again - and no one has ever come up with an objective answer.

If you're goal is to improve the overall well-being (as well as prevent as much damage to well-being as you can), then your question answers itself when put that way.

That's not an objective reason to improve overall well-being - which an objective morality has to provide.  It's assuming that there's an objective reason for doing so, then addressing how to objectively do so.  It's a good proof - but of the wrong thing.

And how does it not have to do with the question?

The question of whether there's an objective morality depends on whether there's an objective morality.  I'd think that would be kind of obvious.  Proving that there's an objective way to assess how to reach a goal isn't showing that the goal is objectively moral - or that there's any such thing as objective morality.  You keep sidestepping that point.  You prove all sorts of objective things - but you're assuming an objective morality without showing that there's any such thing.

You'll have to show that, absent any mind (objectively - inherent in the thing itself), there's a reason for something to be "better" (more moral) than some other thing.  (And, since "better" is purely subjective, you're trying to prove something that, at the very least, is impossible.  IOW, "objective morality" is an oxymoron.)

I already stated that it was a separate question from my OP that I made in my 2nd post on the 1st page (and the 2 can't even be construed as having been the same question). If you know the outcome (you, an innocent, die to certainly save 20 other innocents) then you can make an objectively moral assessment on what action to take on Harris' argument on what morality is.

Only if there's an objective reason to kill one person to save 20, and that's the point that still hasn't been addressed.  You're using your assertion that there's an objective morality as evidence that there's an objective morality.

Before you can address anything about objective morality (which is all you and Harris are doing) you  have to show that there is an objective morality (basically some "objective better") - which you've both failed to do so far.

[GurrenLagann]

So what's the objective reason that sacrificing an innocent man to save more than one innocent man is moral?  (An objective moral code would have an objective reason for an act being moral.)  Harris' statement above has nothing to do with the question.

It's the lifeboat question all over again - and no one has ever come up with an objective answer.

If you're goal is to improve the overall well-being (as well as prevent as much damage to well-being as you can), then your question answers itself when put that way.

That's not an objective reason to improve overall well-being - which an objective morality has to provide.  It's assuming that there's an objective reason for doing so, then addressing how to objectively do so.  It's a good proof - but of the wrong thing.

And yet again, you've confused two different things. As I say above, you're confusing what is moral (on Harris definition of it) with why be moral? That's a distinction you're not taking into account. If we know what we mean by "well-being", Harris' assertion is that we can then determine what is the objectively right thing to do if you wish to preserve and/or improve it.

The question of whether there's an objective morality depends on whether there's an objective morality.  I'd think that would be kind of obvious.  Proving that there's an objective way to assess how to reach a goal isn't showing that the goal is objectively moral - or that there's any such thing as objective morality.  You keep sidestepping that point.  You prove all sorts of objective things - but you're assuming an objective morality without showing that there's any such thing.

If, when you talk about morality, you necessarily are referring to what relates to the well-being of concious creatures (Harris asserts that you cannot refer to what is moral without doing so), then it can be said that actions can be objectively assesed to be moral or not. An assessment of whether or not an action is objectively moral is not an assessment of the "nature" of morality, since it isn't some existent thing. It's a description of an action.

The equivalence of what you are doing is if I said "It is objectively the case that if you want to win a track race, you should run the fastest", and then you follow up with "Yeah, but is running objectively running?" It's validation (i.e why you should do it) is in the statement itself, with relation to intent. It doesn't say anything about you needing to do so.

You'll have to show that, absent any mind (objectively - inherent in the thing itself), there's a reason for something to be "better" (more moral) than some other thing.  (And, since "better" is purely subjective, you're trying to prove something that, at the very least, is impossible.  IOW, "objective morality" is an oxymoron.)

Er, no. "Absent a mind", morality is a vacuous term on Harris' definition. Only concious beings have the potential to be moral agents, so absent a mind it's strictly a meaningless concept. And since on Harris' argument well-being can be somewhat defined with respect to flourishing of sentient beings, what is "better" can in fact be assesed (at least in principle). And you've confused objective with intrinsic, which aren't fully interchangeable. An atom's mass is an intrinsic quality, but an atom's position can be assessed objectively but it isn't intrinsic.

Only if there's an objective reason to kill one person to save 20, and that's the point that still hasn't been addressed.  You're using your assertion that there's an objective morality as evidence that there's an objective morality.

If your goal is to preserve or improve well-being, then your question falls as answered. You're forgetting that the is-ought can be crossed via goal-directed intention (as per my track race example earlier).

Before you can address anything about objective morality (which is all you and Harris are doing) you  have to show that there is an objective morality (basically some "objective better") - which you've both failed to do so far.

I've responded to this in an above quote I believe. You're talking about morality as a sort of thing, rather than a description of actions.

[Jmpty]

I'm reminded of the people who, when attempting to denigrate Islam, they bring up Aisha, and refer to Muhammed as a pedophile, when it was perfectly "moral" and culturally acceptable at the time. The child bride thing is still accepted in many cultures today, but the west finds it morally unacceptable. Morals are cultural constructs. Period.

[Colanth]

You're talking about morality as a sort of thing, rather than a description of actions.

Because you're using the word that way.  An "objective description of actions" is fallacy of equivocation when you're talking about objective morality.