Instrumental oughts - deriving an ought from an is?

[entropy]

In the arguments I've seen where people are trying to logically derive an "ought" from what "is" through induction and/or deduction, I have noticed a tendency of such arguments to do what I call the "instrumental ought gambit". An instrumental ought is where there is a goal and there is a way to achieve that goal - the way to achieve that goal is the way you ought to act if you want to achieve your goal. Instrumental oughts can be derived from what "is". For example:

Suppose you decide your goal is to improve your physical endurance. The way to do that is to use your body to do more physical tasks. You ought to use your body more to do physical tasks. That is an instrumental ought and it is derived from what is the case about physical endurance.

But, of course, the instrumental ought is contingent on there being a goal - in this case, the goal of improving physical endurance. The question that could be asked is - why is improving your physical endurance your goal?

That is where I've noticed people moving into the instrumental ought gambit - by claiming that given some "objective" criteria, they can identify goals that are (ises) the goals. If a goal is objectively identified, then the only question becomes what is the action that achieves that goal and that implies what ought to be done.

The only way I can see this argument working is if you assume a complete determinism. The goal is what it is because it can't be anything else. If it is assumed there is no free will, then if you can correctly identify the determined goal and you can correctly identify the factors that go into achieving that goal, then you can know what you ought to do.

But if there is free will (of the incompatiblist type) that has the capacity to choose the goal it wants, then how can you declare certain goals to objectively be the ones that ought to be chosen? If the goal is not of your own choosing, then how is it that the goal is, never-the-less, the objective goal? Yet, I have seen arguments that try to posit that we have at least some free will (in the incompatiblist sense) AND we can objectively identify the goals we ought to have. Maybe I've missed something crucial, but I don't see how you posit determinism to justify what is essentially an instrumental ought and then also posit free will to moral actors who then are claimed are morally obligated to follow the instrumental ought that has a goal not of their choosing.

[Sal1981]

That's a handful.

I don't think you can, at least objectively, derive an ought from an is.

I don't consider morality to be contingent on free will of any type, only responsibility. For me, I consider these responsibilities as results from actions upon the world and its inhabitants, also lack of action where it is desired and necessary. I don't care if people find this objective or subjective, only effects on the real world that affect me are of any real concern.

[entropy]

That's a handful.

I don't think you can, at least objectively, derive an ought from an is.

I don't consider morality to be contingent on free will of any type, only responsibility. For me, I consider these responsibilities as results from actions upon the world and its inhabitants, also lack of action where it is desired and necessary. I don't care if people find this objective or subjective, only effects on the real world that affect me are of any real concern.

I am an amoralist. I think what we generally refer to as morals are collections of strong sentiments we have about interacting with other people. For me, the term "ought" is just a signifier for a strong sentiment I have about how people interact - or, in the collective sense, "ought" signifies a general consensus within a group of a strong sentiment about the way people interact. For me, it doesn't mean much to say that you can derive an ought from an is because, for me, the term "ought" just signifies what is a strong attitude that an individual or group has about the way people interact. I don't think there is a metaphysically absolute sense in which an "ought" can be considered to be true other than true as an accurate description of people's attitudes.


I like your yin-yang symbol. That symbol is one of my favorites. The closest I come to having what might be considered religious thoughts is when I contemplate the early lines of the Tao Te Ching.

[Sal1981]

I like your yin-yang symbol. That symbol is one of my favorites. The closest I come to having what might be considered religious thoughts is when I contemplate the early lines of the Tao Te Ching.

Balance in Everything.

[the_antithesis]

The thing about the is/ought problem is that they are like saying the "The dress is blue therefore it ought to be size 36."

These are unrelated concepts that idiots try to stick together with stupidity and dried semen.

[the_antithesis]

The thing about the is/ought problem is that they are like saying the "The dress is blue therefore it ought to be size 36."

These are unrelated concepts that idiots try to stick together with stupidity and dried semen.

[entropy]

The thing about the is/ought problem is that they are like saying the "The dress is blue therefore it ought to be size 36."

These are unrelated concepts that idiots try to stick together with stupidity and dried semen.

Hume presented the is/ought problem in the context of trying to refute moral rationalists:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_rationalism

Moral rationalism, also called ethical rationalism, is a view in meta-ethics (specifically the epistemology of ethics) according to which moral truths (or at least general moral principles) are knowable a priori, by reason alone. Some prominent figures in the history of philosophy who have defended moral rationalism are Plato and Immanuel Kant. Perhaps the most prominent figure in the history of philosophy who has rejected moral rationalism is David Hume. Recent philosophers who have defended moral rationalism include Richard Hare, Christine Korsgaard, Alan Gewirth, and Michael Smith (1994).
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Criticisms

Moral sense theorists (or sentimentalists), such as David Hume, are the key opponents of moral rationalism. In Book 3 of A Treatise of Human Nature and in An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (EPM), Hume argues (among other things) that reason and emotions (or the "passions" as he often calls them) are quite distinct faculties and that the foundations of morality lie in sentiment, not reason. Hume takes it as a fact about human psychology and morality that moral judgments have an essentially emotional, sentimental, or otherwise non-rational or cognitive character to them. According to Hume, "...morality is determined by sentiment. It defines virtue to be whatever mental action or quality gives to a spectator the pleasing sentiment of approbation; and vice the contrary" (EPM, Appendix 1, ¶10).

I lean heavily towards favoring moral sense theories rather than the rationalist moral theories and a not insignificant reason for that is Hume's arguments about what it means to try to derive a moral ought from what is through inductive or deductive inference.

The reason I brought this up is because I was interested to see if any of the libertarians (who tend to favor rationalist theories of morality) - especially those who think Ayn Rand's philosophy is right - would come to the defense of rationalists by making a counter-argument to the argument I presented in the OP. I am not sure because I haven't read Ayn Rand really extensively, but to the extent that I have been able to decipher her arguments about what makes morality objective, she seems to be making a rationalist argument. Perhaps I misunderstand her reasoning, though. I'm not sure if Rand used an "instrumental ought gambit" as I call it so maybe she doesn't (that's why I made the post - to get a conversation about it started), but if not, then I don't understand how she connects the "is" of the world with moral oughts. Her arguments seem to leave dangling bits that don't seem to logically connect with respect to deriving moral oughts from what is.

[Solitary]

I is and ought not deprive him of his is.  :shock:    Solitary