Is the future already written?

[Baruch]

Binary thinking is for young computer scientists.  Us more experienced folks have gotten beyond that.  It isn't this or that ... and those are mutually exclusive (though they can be) ... it is much more complicated.  On how we decide what we decide ... it is both contained and free, both conscious and unconscious.

[Hydra009]

I went to sleep, forgot about this thread, and had cereal for breakfast.  *shrugs*

[luckswallowsall]

So we're mostly talking about the same thing but with a difference of semantic opinion.

Yes. But semantics is important. Many logical mistakes can be made due to bad semantics.

I don't think you can call it 'the' future without being able to say what it actually is.

I disagree because the future merely refers to whatever will happen... there is a big difference to referring to the future and making claims about its nature. It's the same with anything else. It's one thing to refer to something and quite another thing to refer to what that something is. The whole existence/essence distinction. The difference between thatness and whatness.

Yes, there is a set of events that will come to pass.

That's the future.

But we cannot say what it is,

We don't have to.

so from our perspective it must be 'a' future, even if it does all happen.

Again, usually when we talk of 'a' future we are talking of a possible future. And to speak of "the possible future" sounds strange. This is because "the future" refers to "the actual future". Which refers to whatever will come to be.

"The" is definite; "a/an" is indefinite, and the future is definitely indefinite.

Well you've already contradicted yourself right there... if the future is definitely indefinite but 'the' refers to what's definite then 'the future' definitely refers to the definite future. You can't both say that 'the' always refers to the definite but also say that 'the future' refers to the indefinite.

Yes, we don't know what the future will be. The point is that when we talk of 'the future' we are speaking of whatever will come to pass.

And yes, from our perspective we don't know what the future will be. But that's a matter of epistemology, which is apart from metaphysics. What we know or don't know of the future is a separate question to what the future is. There are many things that may come to exist that can never be predicted and there are many things that we may think we can predict but that actually never come to exist. Our attempt at predictions and what is actually knowable are both separate questions to what 'the future' refers to.

I don't think you can get away from the fact that 'the' refers to what's actual (or as you say, what's definite), and therefore 'the future' refers to the actual future, whatever it will be. It's much clearer to talk of possible futures when we're talking of possible futures. We should only use the definite article when we're talking about the definite future.

[luckswallowsall]

f~~~ing bulÅŸit.

every sane person has free will. like me.
if i didnt want~i wouldnt write this entry, but i wanted with my freewill and i affected the future. its not prewritten.

What do you mean when you say the future is not prewritten? I don't think anyone here is suggesting that the creator of the universe has already written what will happen.

There's no way you can possibly know that the future is not determined. That's completely different to religious predestinationism. Determinism can simply be a matter of a causal universe with only one physically possible future at any given time. I'm referring to philosophical determinism. Another name for it is "mechanism":

Mechanism is a philosophical perspective that holds that phenomena are solely determined by mechanical principles, therefore, they can be adequately explained by certain mechanical principles alone. Mechanism is often associated with such ontological views as atomism, materialism, and physicalism.

Source: http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Mechanism_(philosophy)

[luckswallowsall]

In many philosophical arguments, it is frogs arguing with canaries.  The frogs can't fly and the canaries can't swim.  They are in different "magisteria".  See Stephen Jay Gould.

Which is to say, one is arguing about contingent things, not tautology or contradiction.  And the only way out of that is empiricism.  But if the two parties are sufficiently different, then their "magisteria" are more or less non-overlapping.

PS ... my "magisteria" is relatively non-overlapping with other posters, because I am a heretic theist.

Stephen Jay Gould's non-overlapping magesteria refers to the fact that science can't address supernatural claims because supernatural claims are unfalsifable. He's right about that. But he also seems to say that religion can answer questions that science can't. He's wrong about that.

In any case, that has absolutely nothing to do with the topic of free will and the two types.

Yes, one is practical, you can call it 'emprical' if you like... but that's besides the point.

One indeed may be making tautological points, but if those points refer to the fact that the opposite case is an oxymoron or logical contradiction, then that rules out its possibility.

As I already explained... you're either in category (a), (b), (c), (d), because those options are logically exhaustive.

[luckswallowsall]

QM says that determinism is more or less false.  RT says that measurements are more or less relative.  Is that you Sir Isaac?

Quantum indeterminacy, also known as quantum unpredictability, refers to scientists' inability to predict or determine causality once it gets down to the quantum level. And even if it can be known that the phenomenological realm, what can be empirically tested by science, is indeed acausal... this says nothing of the noumenological realm, or objective reality outside of what science can test.

In short, philosophical indeterminism is completely different to quantum indeterminacy and philosophical determinism is therefore completely compatible with quantum indeterminacy.

[luckswallowsall]

You may not realize this.  But Cavebear is right.  Your statement is theological, except you don't have the intellectual history to realize this.  The absolute is inherently monotheistic ... that is why it shows up so much in monotheist theology.  It is a consequence of a posited omniscient Being.

My statement is not theological because, again, I am referring to philosophical determinism... not religious predestinationism.

[luckswallowsall]

Binary thinking is for young computer scientists.  Us more experienced folks have gotten beyond that.  It isn't this or that ... and those are mutually exclusive (though they can be) ... it is much more complicated.  On how we decide what we decide ... it is both contained and free, both conscious and unconscious.

You can call true dichotomies "binary thinking" all you like, but it won't make a true dichotomy a false dichotomy, nor will it make a false dichotomy a true one, A not A or a contradiction not a contradiction. And it's special pleading to accept logic in all areas besides something like, for example, free will.

But, again, first "free will" needs to be defined, because there's more than one kind. And, as explained, you either fall into group (a), (b), (c), or (d), as I have already elucidated. That is logically exhaustive. You can't just step out of logic by saying it's "binary thinking". I'm sure you'll accept logic when it suits you.

[Hydra009]

if i didnt want~i wouldnt write this entry, but i wanted with my freewill and i affected the future. its not prewritten.

Don't worry about the vase.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eVF4kebiks4

[Baruch]

Stephen Jay Gould's non-overlapping magesteria refers to the fact that science can't address supernatural claims because supernatural claims are unfalsifable. He's right about that. But he also seems to say that religion can answer questions that science can't. He's wrong about that.

In any case, that has absolutely nothing to do with the topic of free will and the two types.

Yes, one is practical, you can call it 'emprical' if you like... but that's besides the point.

One indeed may be making tautological points, but if those points refer to the fact that the opposite case is an oxymoron or logical contradiction, then that rules out its possibility.

As I already explained... you're either in category (a), (b), (c), (d), because those options are logically exhaustive.

And that is your opinion, not you knowledge.  Since you are rhetorical ... I can't assume you actually believe what you write.

[Baruch]

My statement is not theological because, again, I am referring to philosophical determinism... not religious predestinationism.

Out of historical ignorance.  But then all the Enlightenment figures were ignorant of the work done before, they were all geniuses, in their own minds.  I remain skeptical, if not Pyrrhonian.  There have been many megalomanics and mere egomaniacs down the ages.  Pythagoras for example.  Do you avoid beans ... if you are of his mystery cult?

[Baruch]

You can call true dichotomies "binary thinking" all you like, but it won't make a true dichotomy a false dichotomy, nor will it make a false dichotomy a true one, A not A or a contradiction not a contradiction. And it's special pleading to accept logic in all areas besides something like, for example, free will.

But, again, first "free will" needs to be defined, because there's more than one kind. And, as explained, you either fall into group (a), (b), (c), or (d), as I have already elucidated. That is logically exhaustive. You can't just step out of logic by saying it's "binary thinking". I'm sure you'll accept logic when it suits you.

There are few true opposites .. in fact one would have to prove that up front, rather than assuming it.  0/1 aka binary .. those two values are not opposites.  And in the messy world of philosophy (even philosophy of maths) ... it all does come down to semantics.  And what about Kripke Semantics then?

[Baruch]

Quantum indeterminacy, also known as quantum unpredictability, refers to scientists' inability to predict or determine causality once it gets down to the quantum level. And even if it can be known that the phenomenological realm, what can be empirically tested by science, is indeed acausal... this says nothing of the noumenological realm, or objective reality outside of what science can test.

In short, philosophical indeterminism is completely different to quantum indeterminacy and philosophical determinism is therefore completely compatible with quantum indeterminacy.

Not if you are a reductionist.  Only if you allow only partially overlapping magisteria ... aka the measurement problem.  Your skepticism is black/white ... as are your assertions.  You will never understand fuzzy logic.  It actually used in engineering of Tokyo subways.

[luckswallowsall]

And that is your opinion, not you knowledge.  Since you are rhetorical ... I can't assume you actually believe what you write.

Again, the options I suggested are logically exhaustive. So it's more than just an opinion. Either (a), (b), (c), or (d) is true for reasons given.

[luckswallowsall]

Out of historical ignorance.  But then all the Enlightenment figures were ignorant of the work done before, they were all geniuses, in their own minds.  I remain skeptical, if not Pyrrhonian.  There have been many megalomanics and mere egomaniacs down the ages.  Pythagoras for example.  Do you avoid beans ... if you are of his mystery cult?

What I am saying has absolutely nothing to do with history. I am referring to the fact that the term "philosophical determinism" refers to something completely different to religious predestinationism.

To repeat, religious predestinationism refers to the idea that God has already written the future.

Philosophical determinism on the other hand simply refers to the notion that there's only one physically possible future. It is also known as "mechanism" in philosophy and if anything it's more subscribed to by atheists than theists... so to keep insisting I'm referring to something teleological is quite absurd.

And I don't understand your question when you ask if I avoid beans . . . you appear to only be interested in making strawmen out of my arguments.