If a being exists in all possible words, does that mean that he is greater in quantity?
If a being is the greatest in quantity, does it mean that he exists in all possible worlds?
And... are these questions basically the same?
I feel that there is something wrong with them, but I can't put my finger on what it is. Or maybe there isn't. Maybe you guys can help?
Quantity is about amount. No matter in how many worlds you exist, you're still just 1. "A being", by definition, cannot have the greatest quantity, because it's just one being.
The questions simply don't make any sense.
Exactly, you have a singular/plural mismatch.
Ah, then let me explain how I came up with these doubts.
I was thinking about the ontological argument, and about the "Greatest Possible Being". But then I wondered, greatest in WHAT? Greatest in quality or quantity? Or both?
Putting quality aside, I thought what if it was the greatest in quantity. If one thing is the greatest in quantity, I thought how can this ONE thing be greater in quantity if it's ONE being? The only way was for it to exist in various worlds, or so I thought. But I was wondering if this last resort was a valid argument, hence this thread.
I'll be very glad if it's NOT VALID, because I'm an atheist and this is bugging me too much.
And please don't post refutations to the ontological argument if you were going to because I have already dealt with it, and this specific doubt is what is bugging me.
So I guess the answer is NO to both questions?
It's not valid, no. The whole basic concept of "greatest possible being" is nonsense. You can't be the greatest in a multi-dimensional metric. Only properties that reduce to a scalar can be compared like that.
Quote from: "Plu"The questions simply don't make any sense.
Questions need to be thought through/phrased correctly.
they are non-nonsensical in their current form.
Sorry, bad english. But Plu got it spot on.
Ah, also, a being that exists in every possible world is greater in quantity than a being that exists only in some worlds?
Or does the same principle apply to this question as well
It does. It is still the same being. It's the same as asking "is a 10ft tall tree more trees than a 6ft tall tree?"
Yeah, hahaha
I thought about it like this: There is, for example, a chair. And if this chair exists in 30 worlds, it doesn't mean that there are 30 chairs, one for each world. It simply means that this ONE chair exists in some and does not in others.
Quote from: "Tryed"Ah, also, a being that exists in every possible world is greater in quantity than a being that exists only in some worlds?
Or does the same principle apply to this question as well
This question is pointless to anyone who does not have first hand knowledge of worlds other than this one.
The quantity of one being is one, regardless of the rest of the sentence you attach "one being" to. ("A being" means the same as "one being" in this case.)
Okay. Now, are our conclusions somehow incompatible with the notion of multiple realities (like schrodinger's cat example)?
Is a chair in this universe the same chair that is in another universe? Or are they two different chairs?
If the latter is true, doesn't that mean that we could quantify the existence of something even though, in this world, there is only one of that thing?
I'm basically trying to figure a way to stick with the notion of multiple universes/realities and the notion that a god cannot be quantified, so no one can say that he exists in
most worlds than anything else, thus making him necessary.
So to summarize, if I stick with multiple universes, am I necessarily agreeing that god can be quantified to exist in all possible worlds if, hypotetically, this god is the greatest possible being?
Oh dear, I see part of the Plantinga's Ontological argument. Just know that Plantinga's attempt allows you to come to contradictory conclusions from the same argument, and is therefore invalid.
As I said I don't want refutations for any other arguments, I just want some answers for my questions.
It's not a refutation of another argument. This is about the concept of a "greatest conceivable being" in relation to possible worlds, yes? That's exactly what Plantinga's Ontologicial argument is all about, which is that a greatest conceivable being, if it can exists in any possible world, must therefore exist in all of them, including the actual world.
It's not a change in quantity, just scope.
Possible worlds simple refers to the concept of differing realities, in the sense that something could or could not have been true. So, in some possible world, it can be said that Mitt Romney became the President of the USA by winning the 2012 election.
Wikipedia has a good article on it by the way: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Possible_worlds (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Possible_worlds)
As far as I knew, the greatest concevable being was "greatest" only in quality and not in quantity, or scope if you prefer. Does it change anything at all?
My question is if I can stick with the multiverse/many universes theory and still not be able to quantify single things by saying that many of this single thing exists in other universes, or have god using scope to exist in all these universes and becoming necessary.
Scope is not the exact same thing as quantity in this case, it's still the same being.
And the answer to your question is yes methinks. There is no necessity of a god/"greatest conceivable being" there. As I said previously, the possible worlds proposition is an attempt to say that if you admit that the greatest conceivable being exists in a possible world (a possible state of afairs), it then follows that it necessarily exists (although, the argument fails for this reason as well). Multiverse hypothesis isn't quite the same thing as possible worlds.
Scope is not the exact same thing as quantity in this case, it's still the same being, in this case a being that is supposed to be omnipresent.
And the answer to your question is yes methinks. There is no necessity of a god/"greatest conceivable being" there. As I said previously, the possible worlds proposition is an attempt to say that if you admit that the greatest conceivable being exists in a possible world (a possible state of afairs), it then follows that it necessarily exists (although, the argument fails for this reason as well). Multiverse hypothesis isn't quite the same thing as possible worlds.
Okay, so I can't use multiple worlds as an excuse to quantify a single being or thing, like saying, "there isn't only one pillow, there are 30 pillows, one in each world". That's invalid.
But I can still say that I exist in some other universes where I'm doing something different right now and say that there are many Tryedzes out there.
Are you sure there is no contradiction?
This is hopefully my final question
You misunderstood what I was saying about scope (Or I was unclear). I was referring to God, in that the greatest conceivable being is supposed to exist in all places and times. Or something. I was only referring to God.
Well, no. As I say, multiverse aren't the same sort of thing as possible worlds. The latter refers to possible states of afairs ("Mitt Romney possibly became the US President in 2012").
Multiverses don't have the luxury of necessarily having practically innumerable variations like possible worlds.
Quote from: "GurrenLagann"...Multiverse hypothesis isn't quite the same thing as possible worlds.
I think this is key to remember. A possible world is simply the way the world could have been (which is yet undefined by ontological proponents... Ontologists?) A multiverse is worlds that may very well be out there.
But if one takes the ontological argument to it's conclusion, the "being" described would have to be the "greatest" in "everything" (also still undefined). Quality, quantity, ability, thought, action, penis size, everything you could imagine - it's the greatest. I think the apologist means that the being would necessarily exist in whatever world we could have found ourselves in, thus it exists in this one. So it would be one being, one world.
...I know you don't want refutations of the ontological argument, but just as an aside: a "god" wouldn't
necessarily be the greatest conceivable being - just one capable of creating a universe. Great compared to us, but there could be a greater being that we're not aware of. If the apologist then says, "well,
that being would be God," then we have an infinite regress and no starting point from which to launch the argument.
Is that flawed?
Ah, so multiple worlds are worlds that our world could have been, it has to do with possibility, and has nothing to do with parallel worlds? I see. Thanks for the clarification.
So assuming there are parallel worlds, in a different parallel world than ours, god may exist, and in another, he may not. Necessity and contingency applies to possible worlds but not parallel worlds then?
Is that right?
Put aside for a moment the concept of the multiverse, and pretend, for the sake of clarity, that the Universe is the sum total of all that exists. If this were the case, the greatest possible (or conceivable) being would be a self-conscious Universe. Such a being would permeate, be made up of, and be equal to the sum total of all that exists. A being greater than this could not exist.
Now, if we accept the multiverse as reality, nothing really changes. The greatest possible (or conceivable) being would be a self-conscious multiverse. Such a being would permeate, be made up of, and be equal to - the sum total of all that exists.
It is possible that such a being does exist, but if it does, you and I would be on its radar to the same degree that the subatomic particles that make up the bacteria in our lower intestinal tracts are on our radar.
Cool, can I have some other opinions about my last post people?
Quote from: "Davka"Put aside for a moment the concept of the multiverse, and pretend, for the sake of clarity, that the Universe is the sum total of all that exists. If this were the case, the greatest possible (or conceivable) being would be a self-conscious Universe. Such a being would permeate, be made up of, and be equal to the sum total of all that exists. A being greater than this could not exist.
A being that could create that universe, while not itself existing, would be far greater than the being that is the universe.
Quote from: "Colanth"Quote from: "Davka"Put aside for a moment the concept of the multiverse, and pretend, for the sake of clarity, that the Universe is the sum total of all that exists. If this were the case, the greatest possible (or conceivable) being would be a self-conscious Universe. Such a being would permeate, be made up of, and be equal to the sum total of all that exists. A being greater than this could not exist.
A being that could create that universe, while not itself existing, would be far greater than the being that is the universe.
I think his point can be better expressed as follows, as I think you may have slightly misunderstood his starting point:
1) "Universe" can be used to refer to the totality of existence.
2) The "greatest conceivable being" (GCB) exists.
2.1) Therefore "Universe" includes the GCB within its referential scope.
3) Nothing greater than the GCB can be conceived of by definition.
3.1) The universe - referring to the sum total of existence itself - can therefore not be greater than, nor encompass, the GCB.
4) Therefore the Universe must
necessarily be the GCB.
I hope that was clear (and a correct depiction Davka). :)
Edit: Reread your post. Hm, Colanth that's nonsensical. A being that does not exist couldn't do anything. And that's an old argument, if I recall. :P Like, 50 years old. xD
Quote from: "Tryed"If a being exists in all possible words, does that mean that he is greater in quantity?
If a being is the greatest in quantity, does it mean that he exists in all possible worlds?
And... are these questions basically the same?
I feel that there is something wrong with them, but I can't put my finger on what it is. Or maybe there isn't. Maybe you guys can help?
I guess I would have to answer "yes" to that. Because if multiverses exist in every possible configuration and combination however difficult that number for us to calculate it would make out existence in this world so inevitable that God is no longer required as a argument for first cause. God would just give way to natural happenstance in a plethora of every possible physical accident.
After having determined that the Universe must neccesarily be the GCB, you can also easily break it down as a meaningless term.
After all; being the same in all worlds, requires it to exist in all worlds. But as it is the entirety of the universe, this requires all worlds to be exactly the same. Thus, there is only one meaningful universe or there is no GCB that is the same in all universes. Either way, end of argument.
Personally I have no more problems with differently tuned universes with their differing laws of physics forbidding the existence of livings things in them (dead universes in other words) than I have with the more scientifically factual dead planets such as Venus and Mercury. So the reason why the universe appears so "miraculously" fined tuned for us is no miracle at all it is just simply because we cannot possibly exist in any of the "out of tune" ones
Quote from: "Tryed"Ah, so multiple worlds are worlds that our world could have been, it has to do with possibility, and has nothing to do with parallel worlds? I see. Thanks for the clarification.
So assuming there are parallel worlds, in a different parallel world than ours, god may exist, and in another, he may not. Necessity and contingency applies to possible worlds but not parallel worlds then?
Is that right?
Possible worlds are worlds that our world could have been, multiple words are parallel worlds. And I don't think we can deduce anything about what does or does not exist in a parallel world, that's not what the OA posits. If god(s) exist as part of this universe, then I suppose your statement could be true. As for a god that created the multiverse, we're 0 for 1 on universes with evidence for that.
Quote from: "Tryed"If a being exists in all possible words, does that mean that he is greater in quantity?
If a being is the greatest in quantity, does it mean that he exists in all possible worlds?
And... are these questions basically the same?
I feel that there is something wrong with them, but I can't put my finger on what it is. Or maybe there isn't. Maybe you guys can help?
Worlds, not words. ;)
And the answer is no, on both, that's not a neccesity.
Also, lol at "He"
And lol at the irrelevant questions. :D
Why would it not be neccesary? Because it could be possible to exist multiple times in the same world. Also, if it's one specific being/entity that exists in multiple world then we can't talk of quantity as it's just one being ... Making the whole thing even dumber.
And no, it's not the same question.
Quote from: "Tryed"Necessity and contingency applies to possible worlds but not parallel worlds then?
Is that right?
And necessity and contingency apply to neither. The apologist will say that they apply to possible worlds, but this argument is completely hypothetical. The ultimate in whatever we can come up with isn't necessary or contingent to any world that could have been, and certainly not to the one in which we find ourselves. It's like Vic Stenger said in his debate with Bill Craig: "Why not posit the greatest conceivable pizza?"
Also, this is another of my questions about the OA - if it's true, then wouldn't its negation also be true? If it's possible that this being does
not exist, then it does not exist in all possible worlds, right? That seems a pretty necessary gap for such a hypothetical being.
Quote from: "Tryed"Ah, so multiple worlds are worlds that our world could have been, it has to do with possibility, and has nothing to do with parallel worlds? I see. Thanks for the clarification.
Actually, "multiple worlds" is an undefined word salad that could mean essentially anything, like most theistic arguments.
QuoteSo assuming there are parallel worlds, in a different parallel world than ours, god may exist, and in another, he may not. Necessity and contingency applies to possible worlds but not parallel worlds then?
Is that right?
Be very careful here. Let's go through it:
We really should use universe, as world could just as easily imply (inhabited) planet. A parallel universe would be a universe that existed parallel to ours. Of course, we do not know if such universe(s) exist so this is 100% hypothetical.
So, if in the hypothetical scenarios there are multiple universes, could 1 or more be created by "god(s)"? In plain words, unless going by the "everything is possible" logic the answer is simply "we don't know". We have never observed anything we have defined as a "creating god", therefor the possibility of such a thing is 100% unknown.
The first question you should ask to whoever is putting forth the scenario is: "Hey, WTF do you mean by god(s), please define what you are talking about". If they just mean any kind of creator I would say "yes" as we already have game designers that have created virtual universes - do these "universes" qualify as universes however? What do we mean by "universe"? And this just goes on and on ...
You see, hypothetical scenarios, with no grounding in the real world, and that are meant to project the possibility of something, are all: UTTERLY WORTHLESS. They can never inform anything at all and are completely irrelevant, not to mention nonsensical.
I have heard of so many arguments ad nauseum that this finely tuned universe is so called "evidence for the existence of God" and be like people in ancient times imagining a planet without the air as we breathe it, but we know today such planets do in fact exist. They have argued over the centuries "there must be a God, look at the beauty and complexity of this "world", with all its water and rivers and life giving rains, it could have been all a frozen alpine wasteland or all desert, but is it just right for us, so there must be a God", totally obvious there is a proliferation of such dead "worlds" ancient astronomers deem as just planets such as the surface of Mars. It never occurred to them that this special "world" they called earth is just another planet that orbits the sun and not a special divinely created world in its privileged centre of the universe.
The argument for the existence of God got a lot flimsier when we did in fact discover there were such worlds and the Earth is not at the privileged centre of the universe after all. And dead universes without heavy matter, a universe with just pure energy, a universe with none of the necessary elements for life such as oxygen and carbon. In fact nature could well create every possible conceivable physical combination such is it did to create every possible type of rocky planet to create earth like planets out of natural happenstance. If scientists discover conclusive evidence that dead universes exist, just as we already know dead planets exist theologians will just have to find another gap for God, but their argument for the existence of God would be flimsier than ever.